{"id":24246,"date":"2024-02-07T08:22:11","date_gmt":"2024-02-07T07:22:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/?p=24246"},"modified":"2024-02-07T08:22:13","modified_gmt":"2024-02-07T07:22:13","slug":"a-quelle-date-le-statut-de-salarie-protege-sapprecie-t-il","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/a-quelle-date-le-statut-de-salarie-protege-sapprecie-t-il\/","title":{"rendered":"A quelle date le statut de \u00ab salari\u00e9 prot\u00e9g\u00e9 \u00bb s\u2019appr\u00e9cie-t-il ?"},"content":{"rendered":"<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Par une d\u00e9cision en date du 31 janvier 2024 (pourvoi n\u00b022-18.618), la Cour de cassation s\u2019int\u00e9resse aux r\u00e8gles r\u00e9gissant les salari\u00e9s prot\u00e9g\u00e9s, en particulier lorsque ces derniers annoncent l\u2019imminence de leur candidature \u00e0 des \u00e9lections professionnelles.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, un salari\u00e9 s\u2019\u00e9tait port\u00e9 candidat aux fonctions de membre du comit\u00e9 d\u2019hygi\u00e8ne, de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et des conditions de travail (CHSCT) par courriel en date du 27 d\u00e9cembre 2016.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">A l&rsquo;\u00e9poque, le tribunal d\u2019instance de Lyon, par jugement dat\u00e9 du 2 juin 2017, a annul\u00e9 les \u00e9lections des repr\u00e9sentants du personnel au CHSCT.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Le 3 juillet 2017, le salari\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 convoqu\u00e9 \u00e0 un entretien pr\u00e9alable en vue de son \u00e9ventuel licenciement, lequel s\u2019est tenu le 12 juillet 2017, avant que ne lui soit notifi\u00e9 son licenciement pour faute grave, par courrier du 18 juillet 2017.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Ce dernier a saisi le 27 avril 2018 la juridiction prud\u2019homale en demandant la requalification de son licenciement pour faute grave en un licenciement nul pour \u00ab\u00a0<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">violation du statut protecteur<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0\u00bb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">En appel, le salari\u00e9 a \u00e9t\u00e9 accueilli en sa demande, la Cour d\u2019appel de Douai ayant retenu qu\u2019il\u00a0:<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">&#8211;\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0s\u2019\u00e9tait port\u00e9 candidat aux \u00e9lections des repr\u00e9sentants du personnel au CHSCT par courriel du 27 d\u00e9cembre 2016\u00a0;<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">&#8211;\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0avait b\u00e9n\u00e9fici\u00e9 du statut protecteur pour une p\u00e9riode de six mois, du 27 d\u00e9cembre 2016 au 27 juin 2016\u00a0;<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">&#8211;\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0faisait l\u2019objet d\u2019une nouvelle p\u00e9riode de protection \u00e0 compter du 4 juillet 2017, au titre de l\u2019imminence de sa candidature \u00e0 de nouvelles \u00e9lections.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Pour en arriver \u00e0 une telle conclusion, la Cour d\u2019appel a consid\u00e9r\u00e9 qu\u2019il fallait se placer <\/span><u style=\"color: black;\">au jour de l\u2019entretien pr\u00e9alable<\/u><span style=\"color: black;\"> pour appr\u00e9cier la connaissance par l\u2019employeur de la candidature du salari\u00e9, de sorte que, le 12 juillet 2017, l\u2019employeur savait quelles \u00e9taient les modalit\u00e9s d\u00e9cid\u00e9es par le coll\u00e8ge d\u00e9signatif le 4 juillet 2017, ainsi que la candidature pr\u00e9sum\u00e9e du salari\u00e9 aux \u00e9lections \u00e0 venir.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Tel n\u2019est pas l\u2019avis de la Cour de cassation, retenant quant \u00e0 elle qu\u2019 \u00ab\u00a0<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">en statuant ainsi, alors qu\u2019elle avait constat\u00e9 que <\/em><strong style=\"color: black;\"><em><u>le salari\u00e9 avait \u00e9t\u00e9 convoqu\u00e9 le 3 juillet 2017 \u00e0 l\u2019entretien pr\u00e9alable au licenciement, date \u00e0 laquelle le salari\u00e9 ne b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiait pas d\u2019un statut protecteur<\/u><\/em><\/strong><em style=\"color: black;\">, la cour d\u2019appel, qui n\u2019a pas tir\u00e9 les cons\u00e9quences l\u00e9gales de ses constatations,\u00a0a viol\u00e9 les textes susvis\u00e9s<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0\u00bb.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Par cette d\u00e9cision, la Cour de cassation affine sa jurisprudence relative \u00e0 la connaissance par l\u2019employeur du caract\u00e8re \u00ab\u00a0<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">imminent<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0\u00bb de la candidature d\u2019un salari\u00e9 \u00e0 des \u00e9lections professionnelles. <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">Jusqu\u2019\u00e0 cette date, la Haute juridiction avait consid\u00e9r\u00e9 que \u00ab\u00a0<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">le caract\u00e8re imminent de la candidature n&rsquo;est pas subordonn\u00e9 \u00e0 la conclusion pr\u00e9alable d&rsquo;un protocole d&rsquo;accord pr\u00e9\u00e9lectoral<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0\u00bb, de sorte que le salari\u00e9 b\u00e9n\u00e9ficiait du statut protecteur lorsque sa candidature avait \u00e9t\u00e9 notifi\u00e9e \u00e0 l\u2019employeur avant la signature du protocole pr\u00e9\u00e9lectoral (<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">Cass. soc. 4 juillet 1990, n\u00b087-44.840\u00a0; Cass. soc. 25 octobre 2017, n\u00b016-13.844<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">) ou encore a cass\u00e9 l\u2019arr\u00eat d\u2019appel qui avait refus\u00e9 \u00ab\u00a0<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">de tenir pour imminente la candidature dont elle reconnaissait que l&#8217;employeur avait eu connaissance et alors que la proc\u00e9dure protectrice est applicable aux candidats au premier comme au second tour<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0\u00bb, le salari\u00e9 ayant en l\u2019esp\u00e8ce manifest\u00e9 sa volont\u00e9 de se pr\u00e9senter aux \u00e9lections, d\u00e8s le premier tour de scrutin, alors que les organisations syndicales repr\u00e9sentatives avaient le monopole de pr\u00e9sentation des candidats (<\/span><em style=\"color: black;\">Cass. soc. 18 novembre 1992, n\u00b088-44.905<\/em><span style=\"color: black;\">).<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/65b9f0c98452800008b2b3b7?search_api_fulltext=&#038;date_du=2024-01-24&#038;date_au=2024-02-06&#038;judilibre_juridiction=cc&#038;judilibre_chambre%5B0%5D=soc&#038;op=Rechercher%20sur%20judilibre&#038;previousdecisionpage=&#038;previousdecisionindex=&#038;nextdecisionpage=0&#038;nextdecisionindex=1\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/www.courdecassation.fr\/decision\/65b9f0c98452800008b2b3b7?search_api_fulltext=&#038;date_du=2024-01-24&#038;date_au=2024-02-06&#038;judilibre_juridiction=cc&#038;judilibre_chambre%5B0%5D=soc&#038;op=Rechercher%20sur%20judilibre&#038;previousdecisionpage=&#038;previousdecisionindex=&#038;nextdecisionpage=0&#038;nextdecisionindex=1<\/a><\/p>\n<p class=\"ql-align-justify\"><span style=\"color: black;\">\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n<p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Par une d\u00e9cision en date du 31 janvier 2024 (pourvoi n\u00b022-18.618), la Cour de cassation s\u2019int\u00e9resse aux r\u00e8gles r\u00e9gissant les salari\u00e9s prot\u00e9g\u00e9s, en particulier lorsque ces derniers annoncent l\u2019imminence de leur candidature \u00e0 des \u00e9lections professionnelles. \u00a0 En l\u2019esp\u00e8ce, un salari\u00e9 s\u2019\u00e9tait port\u00e9 candidat aux fonctions de membre du comit\u00e9 d\u2019hygi\u00e8ne, de s\u00e9curit\u00e9 et des [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":24249,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"_seopress_titles_title":"","_seopress_titles_desc":"","_seopress_robots_index":"","_seopress_robots_follow":"","_seopress_robots_imageindex":"","_seopress_robots_snippet":"","_seopress_robots_primary_cat":"","_seopress_robots_breadcrumbs":"","_seopress_robots_freeze_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_custom_modified_date":"","_seopress_robots_canonical":"","_seopress_social_fb_title":"","_seopress_social_fb_desc":"","_seopress_social_fb_img":"","_seopress_social_fb_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_fb_img_height":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_title":"","_seopress_social_twitter_desc":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img":"","_seopress_social_twitter_img_attachment_id":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_width":0,"_seopress_social_twitter_img_height":0,"_seopress_redirections_value":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled":"","_seopress_redirections_enabled_regex":"","_seopress_redirections_logged_status":"","_seopress_redirections_param":"","_seopress_redirections_type":0,"_seopress_analysis_target_kw":"","_seopress_news_disabled":"","_seopress_video_disabled":"","_seopress_video":[],"_seopress_pro_schemas_manual":[],"_seopress_pro_rich_snippets_disable_all":"","_seopress_pro_rich_snippets_disable":[],"_seopress_pro_schemas":[],"footnotes":""},"categories":[31],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-24246","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-actualites-en-droit-social"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24246","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=24246"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/24246\/revisions"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/24249"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=24246"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=24246"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.voltaire-avocats.com\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=24246"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}